The philosopher Thomas Reid had this objection to Locke’s view of personal identity:
There is another consequence of this doctrine, which follows no less necessarily, though Mr. Locke probably did not see it. It is, that a man may be, and at the same time not be, the person that did a particular action. Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at school.
What is the problem for the memory view? Is this problem decisive or is there any way to fix the problem (and adapt the memory view)?
The Brave officer paradox addresses the idea of whether a person is defined by their own personal identity. This paradox relates to the John Locke comparison of the cobbler and the prince. The question that comes up in Locke's example is whether a prince's brain in a cobbler's body would be defined as a prince or a cobbler. The memory view brings into question how we define the link of memories between beings, and whether the same memory would make two people one in the same. The general has the memory link to the office who has the link to the boy. As described in the reading, using the transitive property, we would assume because G=O and O=B, then G=B as well. This logic is ruled as a paradox as the memory view says the link has to be direct, without third party. Since the general cannot remember the exact memory of his flogging, it is ruled that G cannot = B due to their difference in memory. Despite the confusion, there is a way to fix the problem, but it does prove how the memory view is flawed. I currently do not remember by 2nd, birthday party, yet that does not mean I was not the same person as I was when I was 2. The older general might not remember his 20th birthday party, but that does not mean that he is that same person as he was when he was 20. The officer and the general might bother remember the experience for the 20th party. The officer and the boy might both remember the 5th birthday party. This shows that even if we cannot remember a past experience, we can still be the same person as someone who had that experience. Thus, the conclusion is that this paradox can still be solved by the memory view.
ReplyDeleteThere are significant loopholes with the memory view due to the details of the brave officer scenario. If there is a case where a single body loses the memories of his past self, is he still the same person? This is based on the definition of the memory view that if person A has the memories and experiences of person B, then they must be the same individual, sharing the same identity. The brave officer story shows an officer that has lost the memories of his childhood but still retains the same identity towards those he interacts with. Due to the idea that the officer in the present day, person A, does not retain the memories of his past self, person B, one can infer that they are not the same person. The underlying problem that, when solved, can account for situations such as these is the reformation of the memory view on one's identity. The experiences the officer had as a child did not cease to exist in the past as soon as he forgot about them, but there is also no direct correlation to the memories of person A, and person B. The solution to claim that the officer and the boy are the same identities is through the indirect correlation of memories. The officer remembers having the individual perspective of prior memories when he was in his younger years, and that past person still has memories of himself as a child. When tuning the definition of the memory mindset to make sure it includes the direct and indirect correlation of memories in one person to another, there is no problem occurring with the story of the brave officer.
ReplyDeleteIn Thomas Reid's article, The Brave Officer Paradox, he brings up a problem with the memory view. According to the memory view it is necessary and sufficient to have the same memory in order to be the same person. However, in Reid's article he explains that an officer remembers his experience of being flogged as a boy, and when that officer becomes a general he remembers his experiences as an officer, but when he is the general he does not remember his experiences as a boy. If simplified and this example follows the memory view, A = B and B = C then A = C, but this is not the case as A and C do not equal each other because the general does not remember the experiences of the boy and therefore is unable to have sameness in memory. Since A and C do not have sameness in the necessary and sufficient memory, the memory view of personal identity would then claim that A and C were not the same person. Although the memory view does not work with Reid's example, it can be adapted by modifying it to the view of memory continuity so that a person is not only defined as the same person through sameness of memory during every stage of their life, but that they are the same person through a chain of memories. Using Reid's example, just because the general does not have a direct link to his memories from his experiences as a boy, his indirect link via the officer establishes that he has a chain of memories that still make him the same person.
ReplyDeleteThe issue concerning the memory view in this passage, is that if our memories sums up our personal identity, the fact that the man doesn’t remember being flogged would constitute by John Locke, that he is not the same. However this issue can be seen in a different light, as it is known that our memories don’t really start forming until after the age of three. We are conscious before then and we are still people who have minds and are able to think but if following the idea of memory view we would not be. The guard was conscious and aware while he was being flogged, the fact that he does not remember this encounter does not constitute if he is the same or not because it is innately impossible to remember every encounter and experience in your lifetime. How can we suppose then that the theory of our identity totally depends on our memory and defines who we are? As we mature our opinions differ and we learn new information which causes us to become in a sense "new people". Now, our memories may still be the same and we cannot change the past but does that make us different people? We form new habits and although this man did not remember being flogged it does not mean that now he is older and acting this way towards another human he himself is a different human. So if we look at it through a perspective of indirect memory we see that his memory can be recalled by others and is not a figment of imagination. This relates to the fact that even though he cannot recall the event himself there is proof from others and knowledge that one memory does not define us as individuals. This is also true for the fact that we are the same but as we make new memories we in a way change. This means we evolve as every human does; we still recall core memories and in turn can learn from others memories we may have forgotten.
ReplyDelete